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Legalistic Individualism: An Alternative
Analysis of Kagan's Adversarial Legalism
By MICHAEL DOMINIC MEUTI*
"If a value system is simply presupposed and obeyed as the given
structure of the world that all are made to accept and serve, it can
become systematically destructive without our knowing there is a
moral choice involved. 1
It is easy for American lawyers to forget that there are other
systems out there. After spending three years in an American law
school, where few opportunities for comparative learning arise, they
graduate and begin working. Whether they are at large law firms,
public interest organizations or government agencies, their
encounters with foreign countries' laws are infrequent, and exposure
to foreign procedure is even more uncommon. Because American
law and procedure seem to be all they need to know, U.S. lawyers
rarely bother to learn from alternative systems. However, as
globalization continues to devour the planet, international disputes
will grow more frequent. Many will involve American entities, but
will not take place on American soil. Some will involve-gasp!-
other nations' procedural forms.
An underlying ethos of American law is that an adversarial
setting is a prerequisite for proper resolution of a dispute. But is that
accurate? Can justice be done if the parties are not busy rabidly
advocating diametrically opposed interests? Are other methods
available?
In 1986, Mirjan Damagka observed: "The American legal process
* J.D., Stanford University, 2003. The author is currently a clerk to the Hon. James
S. Gwin in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. He
would like to thank Professor M. Neil Browne, Professor Nancy Kubasek, Professor
Tom Grey and the students in the 2002 Stanford Law School Legal Studies
Colloquium for their inspiration and input.
1. JOHN MCMURTRY, UNEQUAL FREEDOMS: THE GLOBAL MARKET AS AN
ETHICAL SYSTEM 10 (1998).
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allocates an unusually wide range of procedural action to the adverse
parties. ... ,,2 He and other comparative scholars have illustrated the
diversity of methods available. But do these other systems of
resolving disputes work? In Adversarial Legalism, Robert Kagan
considers the merits of these alternative systems.3 While not a
comprehensive study of comparative procedure, Adversarial Legalism
relies heavily on reports of how other industrialized democracies
handle dispute resolution and then evaluates whether the American
method of dispute resolution is the best for which we can hope.
Although the book is not intended as a comprehensive agenda for
reform, Kagan's message is clear-our procedures and methods for
resolving disputes are a matter of choice, no matter how natural or
entrenched they may appear to be, and to the extent they do not
serve us well we choose differently.
Adversarial Legalism is an important book, and will become
more important as international disputes draw American lawyers into
foreign jurisdictions with methods of resolving disputes that look
markedly different from those to which they are accustomed.4 It is
extremely well-written, and offers a balanced account of what Kagan
labels "adversarial legalism." However, as is true of any book
addressing an important topic, Adversarial Legalism has its flaws. In
this essay, I will address what I see as the book's primary
shortcoming: its failure to examine more closely the rich cultural
variables that have produced, and continue to entrench, adversarial
legalism. Part I will review Kagan's thesis. Part II will posit
America's intense ethic of individualism as an alternative explanation
of how adversarial legalism came to dominate the legal landscape.
Finally, Part III will address the reasons why I feel this analysis is
more complete than that provided by Kagan.
2. MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 108
(1986).
3. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001).
4. But see generally Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International
Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (2003); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Americanization
of International Litigation, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (2003).
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I. Adversarial Legalism's Thesis
A. Defining the Problem
Adversarial Legalism is an extended critique of the adversarial
methods that Americans employ to resolve disputes, covering not
only the day-to-day practice of adversarial legal contestation, but also
the formal method of implementing policy and resolving disputes.
Thus, the book is not just a book about the adversary system-
although much of its analysis applies directly to the adversary
system-but also about how policy is created and enforced. Kagan
seeks to determine why it is that, regardless of the method in which
we resolve disputes in court, we choose to use the legal system as the
primary means of resolving social, and even political, disputes.
At first, such a question may seem silly to us-resolving disputes
through formal legal contestation is just how things are done in
America. And that is Kagan's point exactly. He cites numerous
examples indicating that a myriad of alternatives exist for resolving
disputes and creating policy. For example, if you were involved in an
automobile accident in Japan, your case would not be handled
through the traditional channels of tort litigation. Instead, shortly
after the accident a traffic accident investigator would arrive at the
scene to speak to the parties and "hammer out a consensual story as
to what happened., 6 This demonstrates how the Japanese system of
resolving these disputes relies heavily on official investigation, rather
than adversarial argument, to determine fact. But the Japanese
system differs in other ways as well. The Japanese rely heavily on
nonlitigious methods of resolving disputes, such as Traffic Accident
Dispute Resolution Centers.7 These mechanisms and institutions
provide free legal counseling and mediation services. Also, they are
generally successful in keeping cases out of court, as evidenced by the
fact that fewer than 2 percent of auto accident victims in Japan hire
lawyers,8 compared to about 24 percent in the United States.9
5. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (resolving the controversy over the
disputed 2000 presidential election).
6. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 10-11 (citing Takao Tanase, The Management of
Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 651,
673-74 (1990)).
7. Id. at 136.
8. Id. at 137 (citing Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile
Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 651, 660 (1990)).
9. Id.
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Thus, Kagan targets not just the tenor of what goes on in the
courtroom. Instead, he seeks to paint the broader picture of how
disputes are resolved in the United States, paying special attention to
the policy choices made between different types of structures for
resolving disputes, and then to call that picture into question.
"Adversarial legalism" is Kagan's moniker for the American
mode of resolving disputes and implementing policy. It has a number
of constituent elements, including a powerful and politically selected
jury, decentralized government authority, a fragmented court system
and systems of adjudication that give lawyers a powerful role in the
collection and presentation of evidence. 1° These elements distinguish
adversarial legalism from alternative systems for societal management
in at least eight ways.
In general, adversarial legalism involves:
(1) more complex bodies of legal rules; (2) more formal, adversarial
procedures for resolving political and scientific disputes; (3) more
costly forms of legal contestation; (4) stronger, more punitive legal
sanctions; (5) more frequent judicial review of and intervention into
administrative decisions and processes; (6) more political
controversy about legal rules and institutions; (7) more politically
fragmented, less closely coordinated decisionmaking systems; and
(8) more legal uncertainty and instability."
According to Kagan, adversarial legalism's two primary features
are formal legal contestation and litigant activism. 12 To understand
what Kagan means by these terms, it is instructive to compare them to
their opposites.
Kagan distinguishes formal legal contestation from informal
methods of dispute resolution, which include negotiation, mediation,
expert judgment and political judgment." Put more clearly, formal
methods of resolving disputes feature rigid, binding proceedings with
established rules of procedure and truth-determination, whereas
informal methods are more flexible and lack rigidly fixed rules of
evidence-presentation. Kagan also distinguishes systems relying
heavily on party participation from those relying on deference to
hierarchy. One example of a hierarchical system is a large
bureaucracy; another is reliance on expert or political judgment. In
10. Id. at ix.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 10.
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both examples, power is vested in the hands of an official
decisionmaker rather than in the parties.14 If we divide potential
systems of policy implementation and dispute resolution into four
quadrants, adversarial legalism resides in the quadrant where
activism/participation and formality intersect."
The significance of adversarial legalism lies in the fact that no
other country relies on these methods as extensively as the United
States.'6 Other industrialized nations view our system with raised
brows. Our courtroom procedures look much more "fight-
oriented,"'7 and our use of law and lawsuits to achieve policy
outcomes also leaves them scratching their heads. But to say that we
do things differently is not necessarily saying anything of great
moment.
The problem, as Kagan sees it, is that adversarial legalism has
taken over as Americans' dominant mode of resolving disputes and
implementing policy, and its dominance is increasing." To
demonstrate why this is problematic, Kagan points to adversarial
legalism's consequences-costliness and legal uncertainty.' 9 Because
disputes are funneled through a system with detailed and complex
procedural rules, they are not resolved quickly (and time is money,
especially when lawyers are involved). Further, litigant activism
dictates that the parties (and their representatives) gather facts and
then determine which issues are relevant. Thus, systems that rely on
14. Id. Damagka drew a similar distinction between "hierarchical" and
"coordinate" structures of governmental authority. In his typology, hierarchical
authority "is characterized by a professional corps of officials, organized into a
hierarchy which makes decisions according to technical standards." DAMASKA, supra
note 2, at 17. Alternatively, coordinate authority features "a body of nonprofessional
decision makers, organized into a single level of authority which makes decisions by
applying undifferentiated [community] standards." Id. Although parties could
participate in either type of forum, the type of party participation about which Kagan
speaks is more amenable to coordinate authority.
15. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 10. Kagan illustrates the four alternatives with a
chart on this page.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Kagan is not the first scholar to criticize the adversary system for its reliance
on fighting. See, e.g., ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 3 (1996) ("A fight system...
seeks only a victor. It seeks neither truth, nor equity, nor even all information that
might help explain 'what actually happened,' but fails to support the story each party
has determined to sell"); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of
Battle, Sport, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 225 (1995)
(discussing the metaphors that pervade the adversary system).
18. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 13.
19. Id. at 9.
2004]
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litigant activism have a built-in inefficiency-both parties must delve
into the facts of each case and the panoply of legal theories
potentially applicable to that set of facts. Compared to systems that
rely on central investigation, where a government actor gathers
evidence and prunes the conflict of superfluous issues, litigant
activism involves duplicative work."
Legal uncertainty arises from a number of sources. First, in a
nation with fragmented decision-making authority, there is an
incentive for litigants to forum shop. If a favorable result is more
likely in Forum A than in Forum B, it is perfectly rational to make
every attempt to funnel your dispute into Forum A. The United
States' federalist arrangement of legal authority introduces a great
deal of such fragmentation." Combine this fragmentation with a
politically-selected judiciary, argues Kagan, and the result is legal
splintering-the law may be, and often is, different in Nebraska than
it is in Maine.2
This is not to say, however, that Kagan's work unfairly slams
adversarial legalism for its negative features without ever noting the
good that it can produce. Kagan makes clear that adversarial legalism
is unique in its "capacity for heroic moral action"23 and its openness to
"new kinds of justice claims., 24 Some of our most cherished social
changes, from Brown v. Board of Education to prison reform25 to the
women's movement, were fueled by adversarial legalism. In other
systems, lawyers do not feel as free to bring into court the type of
novel legal arguments that produced many of these developments.
Further, judges in other systems have less power to shape legal
20. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823, 826-32 (1985) (arguing that the German, judge-centered fact gathering
procedure is more efficient than the American procedure).
21. Indeed, the problems resulting from the myriad of differences in contract and
commercial law between the states was Karl Llewelyn's primary impetus for
developing the UCC. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 194
(1994).
22. The size and diversity of the U.S. population may also play a role in
producing this uncertainty, although Kagan never addresses the issue directly. Any
nation with such a wide array of industries, ethnicities and climates will necessarily
have a wide variety of interests. Combine those different interests with a
decentralized system of legal authority, and different sets of rules are a perfectly
predictable outcome.
23. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 23.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 19-22, 31. Kagan offers a detailed account of the role adversarial
legalism played in the Southern prison reform cases of the early 1970s.
[Vol. 27:319
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doctrine than their American counterparts and are thus less open to
creative legal arguments.
Despite these virtues, Kagan indicates that the cost and
uncertainty produced by adversarial legalism generate unfairness that
often outweighs these benefits. He notes that often, the advances in
justice brought on by adversarial legalism's flexibility do not flow to
their intended beneficiaries. For example, mass products liability can
be seen as an outgrowth of adversarial legalism's openness to new
theories of recovery. However, in most suits for such injuries,
American lawyers soak up 40 to 50 percent of liability insurers'
expenditures-a total grossly incommensurate with the lower
transaction costs of other industrialized democracies.26 To Kagan, this
illustrates how the costs and inefficiencies of adversarial legalism
have snowballed out of control.
B. Pinpointing the Causes
If this legal system is so unique and so problematic, how and why
did we select it? From where did it come? The underlying cause of
adversarial legalism, according to Kagan, is the tension between
modern political culture's demands for "total justice" and a set of
government structures designed to decentralize power.27
Kagan notes that adversarial legalism has not existed at constant
levels throughout our nation's history.28 Instead, he tells the following
story of the escalation of adversarial legalism. In the 1960s,
Americans began to demand "total justice." They began to notice the
increasing disconnection between the nation's egalitarian ideals and
contemporary American life.29  Further, Americans began to
recognize racial and sex-based discrimination for the evils that they
were, and began to see pollution and injuries resulting from unsafe
products and workplaces not as the inevitable results of modern
society, but rather as preventable. Sensing these injustices and
recognizing the ability of rich societies to compensate victims of
accidents and unfair treatment, Americans mobilized to require such
compensation. ° Emboldened by the Civil Rights Movement's in-
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 34.
28. Id. at 36.
29. Id. at 38.
30. Id. at 39.
2004]
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court success," they turned beyond the political sphere and sought
redress in the courts. The results were an abundance of new issue-
oriented organizations (e.g., environmental, welfare rights and
women's rights organizations) and a cadre of new rights created by
the legislature and the judiciary.32 While the Warren Court was busy
expanding standing to sue government agencies and pushing forward
the "due process revolution,"33 state courts were expanding tort
liability, and Congress was churning out regulatory legislation at an
unparalleled pace. Between 1964 and 1977, Congress passed twenty-
five new civil rights and environmental statutes,34 a total unimaginable
in prior decades. As new rights were created and new organizations
formed, adversarial legalism intensified in lock-step.
This did not have to be the case. In Europe, for example, people
and nations sought the same "total justice" goals, but did not
experience the skyrocketing rates of litigation and stark increases in
number of lawyers per capita that the United States witnessed.35 The
cause of that difference is not a matter of whether laws and
regulations were passed, but rather a matter of how those policies
were implemented. European nations, by and large, enforced their
regulations via government bureaucracies that regulated businesses
and demanded enforcement. The United States, on the other hand,
sought to enforce citizens' new rights through the citizens themselves.
Thus, rather than providing government bureaucracies with sole or
even primary enforcement power, the United States relied on
"private attorneys general"-aggrieved citizens or interest groups
who could seek redress in court.36 Of course, there are reasons for
this difference. Kagan notes that in the United States, legislative
majorities were more tentative than the coalitions formed in
European nations' parliaments.37 Investing power in a bureaucracy in
the United States was a recipe for disaster-once the party in power
left office and the other party took over, control of the bureaucracy
would change hands. So, to entrench the current majority's
31. See GLENDON, supra note 21, at 52 (noting that Thurgood Marshall and his
colleagues at the NAACP turned to the courts because other avenues of social change
were closed off to them).
32. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 38-39.
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id. at 39-40.
36. Id. at 38.
37. Id. at 49.
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preferences regarding substantive policy outcomes, Anierican
legislatures wrote increasingly detailed statutes and relied on private
citizens, rather than bureaucrats, to enforce them.
Although the size of the government grew during the 1960s and
1970s, the United States did not follow the European model of policy
implementation. Those decades did produce a number of new
administrative agencies (the EEOC, the EPA and OSHA, for
example). These new agencies, however, were never granted sole
enforcement power. Instead, judges often read implied rights of
action into the statutes that created the agencies, allowing private
parties to sue these agencies . Further, when the agencies sought
redress of a violation, they generally had to do so through the courts.
And even in those situations where an administrative agency had the
power to resolve a dispute, its decisions were-and are still-often
appealed to the court system. In each of these ways, the United
States employed a model of policy implementation much more
dependent on adversarial litigation than the European model.
Kagan also notes that American legal culture, though it did not
create adversarial legalism, has played a key role in entrenching it.39
After broader cultural and political forces pushed the adversarial
boulder from the top of the hill, American lawyers concentrated
intently on clearing the path of all obstacles. Indeed, they developed
a strong interest in doing so-more adversarial legalism means more
legal disputes, which means more demand for lawyers. Whether
American lawyers were explicitly cognizant of these interests or not,
the interests worked their way into the profession's norms. Perhaps
the greatest example is the distinctly American notion that the
lawyer's first and foremost duty is to zealously represent the client's
interests, with minimal (if any) regard for the social consequences of
the arguments employed or the positions advocated.' Additionally,
the legal uncertainty that stems from our federalist system of
decentralized authority creates a perception that the law is a tool to
be used to bring forth particular policy goals-if the law of the state
in which you might litigate is not advantageous, just find a state in our
federalist "laboratory" with more favorable laws, or argue that the
forum state should learn from the other's wisdom. Opportunities for
such legal maneuvering impress upon American legal professionals
38. Id. at 48.
39. Id. at 55.
40. Id.
2004]
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the view that law is a tool to be used to gain advantage in struggles
among groups, rather than a coherent system of rules demanding
obedience.4 This understanding of law as malleable helps explain the
existence of so many American public interest organizations that
bring lawsuits to further particular policy outcomes. Such
organizations are not prevalent in Europe; indeed, they are virtually
unheard of.
42
In sum, Kagan sees the causes of adversarial legalism as the
existing political culture and structures that lead us to resolve disputes
via individual action rather than effective public enforcement.
C. Where Do We Go from Here?
What to make of this problem of adversarial legalism? If our
system is broken, what can be done to fix it? Kagan recognizes that
reining in adversarial legalism will not be accomplished easily and
that it "will require basic changes in the American way of law."43
However, he offers several suggestions, which he warns "may appear
shocking to readers steeped in the traditions of American adversarial
legalism."" In criminal law, these suggestions include relying less on
the jury trial,45 permitting more active questioning from the bench
and taming the incentive to fight by applying lighter penalties to
minor infractions such as drug possession.47 Kagan also suggests that
greater regulation and insurance could temper the amount of civil
litigation and the degree to which civil trials take on adversarial
forms.48 Also among his suggestions for undermining adversarial
legalism in civil trials are: decreasing the reliance on juries, in favor of
alternatives such as mixed professional and lay panels; 9 and relying
more on neutral, government-appointed experts rather than battling,
party-appointed experts." Finally, in the realm of public and
regulatory law, Kagan recommends less statutory specificity and more
41. Id. at 56.
42. See id. (noting the strong presumption against public interest litigation in
Germany).
43. Id. at 232.
44. Id. at 233.
45. Id. at 233-34.
46. Id. at 234.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 235-36.
49. Id. at 236-38.
50. Id. at 238.
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discretion for officials in both creation and enforcement of
regulations. 1
Many of these suggestions are not politically plausible, and
Kagan recognizes as much. 2 Many of them would require increased
government funding in proportions that American voters would never
tolerate. 3 Others are impracticable because they run so starkly
against the grain of dominant American thought or are
constitutionally barred.54 Kagan states that his purpose in discussing
them is not so much to create a checklist of reforms to undertake, but
rather to "indicate that plausible ways of sharply constraining
adversarial legalism do exist... [and to] help illuminate the attitudes
that entrench adversarial legalism in American life and make it
difficult to tame.,
55
To his credit, Kagan does not prescribe a panacea to the social
and economic maladies triggered by adversarial legalism, and he
notes without hesitation that "American adversarial legalism is far
from the worst of all methods of law and governance. In some
respects, and at some moments, it is the best., 56 Kagan's goal, rather,
is to provide information and raise awareness. Just as increased
knowledge about the hazards of smoking brought on a wave of anti-
smoking sentiment, which later made headways into state and local
laws, Kagan hopes that "enhanced consciousness of the costs and
limits of many current legal institutions and practices, 57 might yield
reforms to the American legal landscape.
II. Adversarial Legalism as Entrenched American
Individualism
Adversarial Legalism is essentially about two things: America's
formal system for handling disputes and the ways in which that
51. Id. at 239-41.
52. Id. at 233. However, Kagan states that these reforms are "plausible in the
sense that they resemble institutional practices employed by other economically
advanced democracies and at least ostensibly would improve the quality of justice in
some important respects." Id.
53. Id. at 242-43.
54. For example, abolishing the civil jury would violate the 7th Amendment, and
permitting a judge to comment on a criminal defendant's decision not to take the
stand would violate the 5th Amendment.
55. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 233.
56. Id. at 251.
57. Id.
20041
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system is used. Both of these make us look strange in the eyes of
other countries' lawyers. No other society champions such an
adversarial method of formally resolving disputes, nor does any
society rely so heavily on the legal system to set policy and to resolve
disputes of all sorts. But why is that? Why have we chosen a path
that is not just the road less traveled, but one that has been chosen by
few other human societies, and never to the same degree?
It is my contention that Kagan's explanation of adversarial
legalism's origins is correct, but incomplete. While there is nothing
logically wrong with his analysis, there are more complete
explanations available. For the remainder of this paper, I will discuss
American individualism as one of these alternative "stories" to
explain why law in America looks so different, and is used in such
different ways, from law in other countries.58
A. Individualism Defined
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Geert Hofstede studied the
cultural values of employees of a multinational corporation. 9
Stretching across sixty-six countries, his research served as the basis
of Culture's Consequences, one of the most important empirical
studies of cultural difference in the past quarter century. From his
observations, Hofstede classified cultural differences along several
dimensions, including power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and
58. While numerous other scholars have noted the connection between
individualism and the adversary system, few have explicated in much detail. See, e.g.,
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2263
(2001) (noting "the individualist logic of the adversary system"); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1367 (1998); Oscar G. Chase, American
"Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 284 (2002);
Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1299, 1301 (1996) (citing Marian Neef & Stuart Nagel, The Adversary Nature of
the American Legal System from a Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y. L.F. 123, 155, 159
(1974)); Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics of Care and Relmagining the
Lawyer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 383, 430-31 (1996).
Other scholars have argued that the connection, though it may exist, is not
necessary. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 426 (1994)
("there is nothing inherently individualistic about justice or rights or even adversarial
procedure."); Martin Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the
Constitutional Role of Self-Interest. The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 359, 366 (2001) ("Adversary theory, then, is necessarily characterized by neither
a rigid, pluralistic, and isolationistic individualism nor an unremittingly antagonistic
approach to issues of conflict resolution.").
59. GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES 11 (1980).
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individualism/collectivism (I/C). This last dimension spawned a wave
of sociocultural research focusing on the continuum between
individualism and collectivism. Indeed, this research became so
prevalent that the distinction between individualism and collectivism
has been labeled "the most important dimension along which
societies can be arrayed,"6 ° and the 1980s have been labeled "the
decade of I/C."61  Scholarship in I/C has led not just to research
studies documenting the extent to which various cultures are
dominated by one mode of thought or the other, but also to analyses
of American culture and society.62 Over the past twenty years, this
body of I/C scholarship has illuminated some very important cultural
distinctions.
While the word "individualism" may bring to mind visions of
Scrooge, the term does not necessarily connote selfishness.63 Instead,
individualism is an amalgam of cultural patterns and modes of
thought that manifest themselves in various ways, both formally and
informally. Harry Triandis defines individualism as:
[A] social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who
view themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily
motivated by their own preferences, rights, and the contracts they
60. MARTIN J. GANNON, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CULTURES: METAPHORICAL
JOURNEYS THROUGH 17 COUNTRIES 339 (1994).
61. Uichol Kim et al., Introduction in INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM:
THEORY, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Uichol Kim et al. eds., 1994).
62. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
63. Alexis de Tocqueville noted as much when he differentiated between
individualism and egoism:
"Individualism" is a word recently coined to express a new idea. Our fathers
knew only about egoism. Egoism is a passionate and exaggerated love of
self which leads a man to think of all things in terms of himself and to prefer
himself to all. Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes
each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into
the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he
gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself. Egoism springs from a
blind instinct; individualism is based on misguided judgment rather than
depraved feeling. It is due more to inadequate understanding than to
perversity of heart. Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism
at first only dams the spring of public virtues, but in the long run it attacks
and destroys all the others too and finally merges in egoism. Egoism is a
vice as old as the world. It is not peculiar to one form of society more than
another. Individualism is of democratic origin and threatens to grow as
conditions get more equal.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506-07 (J.P. Mayer & M.
Lerner, eds., 1966).
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have established with others; give priority to personal goals over
the goals of others; and emphasize rational analyses of the
advantages and disadvantages to associating with others.
64
Attributes of an individualist pattern of thought include an
independent construal of the self, egocentrism, separateness,
autonomy and self-containment.
In an individualist's world, reality begins and ends with the
individual. He downplays his ties to others and emphasizes rights,
rationality and negative liberty over duties, emotions and positive
liberty.' Unfettered choice is not merely a means to the end of
happiness, but also an end in itself. As a consequence of this intense
focus on the individual as the fundamental unit of social reality, talk
of communities as organic entities makes little sense within the
individualist language. 67  A community or society is nothing more
than an aggregation of atomistic individuals, each seeking to
maximize his own interests and well-being. This emphasis on
independence and autonomy leads to a particular set of attitudes and
values. More specifically, individualist attitudes include self-reliance,
hedonism, competition and emotional detachment from groups.'
Individualists tend to value curiosity, open-mindedness, creativity,
variety, pleasure and self-sufficiency. 69 Further, individualists tend to
"attribute events to internal individual causes."7 Each individual is,
therefore, the master of his own destiny, and is responsible for his
position in life. 1
At first, such a description may seem like nothing more than
64. HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 2 (1995).
65. Id. at 7. Phrased differently, individualism "focuses upon the human
condition as it exists apart from others and serves to promote ideas of personal
freedom, self-improvement, privacy, achievement, independence, detachment, and
self-interests." GERRY C. HEARD, BASIC VALUES AND ETHICAL DECISIONs 3 (1990).
66. TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 43-44.
67. See M. Neil Browne & Nancy Kubasek, A Communitarian Green Space
Between Market and Political Rhetoric About Environmental Law, 37 AM. Bus. L.J.
127, 169 (1999).
68. TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 73.
69. Id. at 74.
70. Id. at 71.
71. The use of the male pronoun is intentional, as such detached individualistic
patterns of thought and behavior are generally associated with masculinity, whereas
more relationship-oriented thought and actions tend to be associated with femininity.
See, e.g., RITA C. MANNING, SPEAKING FROM THE HEART: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
ON ETHICS 2-6 (1992); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS
& MORAL EDUCATION 2 (1984).
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common sense to many Americans. To understand that individualism
is more than "the way things are," it is useful to illustrate its
opposite-collectivism. Collectivists, unlike individualists, place
primary emphasis on duties, rather than rights. Subordination of
individual interests to those of the community is not only tolerable,
but honorable]3  By way of example, Confucianism is a classic
collectivist value system. To illustrate its departure from
individualism, one need only consider two of its basic elements, jen
and chuntzu. Jen is defined as "human heartedness or the
simultaneous feeling of humanity toward others and respect for
oneself,"7 and chuntzu represents "someone who is fully adequate
and poised to accommodate others as much as possible rather than
selfishly acquire all that he can."75 The disparity between these two
values and those that support an individualistic value system are
obvious. While individualism is predominant in Western Europe,
Canada and the United States, collectivism dominates most Asian
cultures and strongly influences Latin American cultures as well.
When one of these modes of thought is dominant in a given
society, it produces subtle, yet observable, behavior patterns. For
example, collectivists perceive silence during interpersonal
interactions as a sign of strength, whereas individualists view it as
awkward.76 Similarly, individualists are prone to search for "fun"
situations, whereas collectivists are more inclined "to seek situations
that produce harmonious interpersonal atmospheres. 7 7 Because of
individualists' penchant for rationality, individualist cultures are also
more prone to view argument as an acceptable method of settling a
dispute, while the collectivist's preference for harmony makes it
preferable to just agree and thereby "save face.7 7s The differences
between individualist and collectivist cultures are even reflected in
advertisements. Ads in individualist countries tend to emphasize
benefits that will flow to the individual, whereas ads in collectivist
cultures are more likely to emphasize themes of honor or benefits to
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. ("[Clollectivists are often socialized to enjoy doing their duty, even if that
requires some sacrifices.").
74. GANNON, supra note 60, at 326.
75. Id.
76. TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 76.
77. Id. at 71.
78. GANNON, supra note 60, at 326.
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the user's family.79 Likewise, the differing modes of thought that
support individualism and collectivism are reflected in language, as
evidenced by the negative connotations of the word for "I" in
Chinese culture,8" and the word for "different" in Japanese culture.8"
From a macrosocial perspective, these cultural patterns can help
us understand the structure of a particular society. The more
individualistic a nation, the more likely it is to rely on markets and the
less likely it is to alter the outcome of market processes.82  This
attitude toward markets makes sense-the market promotes
competition and provides rewards for those individuals who work
hard. Further, these rewards flow directly and primarily to those who
produce, rather than to society at large, although social harmony and
advancement are byproducts of this struggle among individuals."83
This system of rewards fits within the individualist framework
because it exalts individual choice, relying on the self-interested
interaction of individuals (rather than a potentially biased central
planner) to distribute resources. Further, the resources are
distributed to those people who produce the goods and services that
the greatest number of individuals desire-and because the individual
is the alpha and omega of reality, who else should determine what is
good for an individual but that individual. Individualist nations are
also prone to limit government involvement in other realms of life,
preferring instead a "night watchman state. '
B. Individualism in America
From the foregoing description of individualism, it should take
little to convince a reader that the United States is a highly
79. TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 133-34.
80. GANNON, supra note 60, at 325.
81. TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 47.
82. M. Neil Browne et al., Individualism and the Market Determination of
Women's Wages in the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 355 (1999). Cf. E.K. HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS: THE EVOLUTION
OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES 38-44 (7th ed. 1995).
83. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 49 (1953)
(noting that Adam Smith argued that "the selfish motives of men are transmuted by
interaction to yield the most unexpected of results: social harmony,").
84. Perhaps the most classic statement of this limited role of government comes
from Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, where he argued that government should
serve only three purposes: protection against foreign invaders, protection of
individuals from injustices suffered at the hands of other citizens, and production of
public goods. See HUNT, supra note 82, at 44.
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individualistic nation. Of course, no nation (and no person, for that
matter) is fully individualistic or collectivistic." But that does not
preclude us from being able to compare nations and to classify a
nation as predominantly individualist or collectivist.
Since our nation's early history, the intensity of its individualism
has been viewed as unique. During a nine-month visit to the United
States in 1831 and 1832, Alexis de Tocqueville "was impressed by the
individualism that seemed to permeate this new society."" The same
cultural patterns that de Tocqueville observed-egalitarianism,
ambition, independence and entrepreneurship-have not dissipated
in the last 170 years. Instead, they have intensified, especially in the
last forty years. 7 Today, America is the primary site on the globe
where individualistic thought flourishes.'
Evidence of America's individualism abounds. Americans'
intense love affairs with freedom 9 and liberty reflect the influence of
the individualist tradition on American thought. Indeed, the names
of many of our national icons (e.g., the Liberty Bell, the Statue of
Liberty) signal the importance with which we view personal liberty.
Prominent figures in our national folklore, from Benjamin Franklin'
to Abraham Lincoln,91 also suggest the importance of individualistic
thought to Americans. Additionally, evidence of the intensity of
America's individualism can be found in the larger structures that
shape our social landscape. The U.S. social safety net is unparalleled
among industrialized nations in its weakness. In 1975, the United
States was the only nation out of sixty-two major industrialized
85. See TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at xiv.
86. Id. at 20.
87. See I3ELLAH ET AL., supra note 62.
88. See, e.g., HOFSTEDE, supra note 59, at 222 (finding that the United States
ranked higher than all other nations on the Individualism Index); CHARLES
HAMPDEN-TURNER & ALFONS TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN CULTURES OF
CAPITALISM: VALUE SYSTEMS FOR CREATING WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN, GERMANY, FRANCE, BRITAIN, SWEDEN, AND THE NETHERLANDS 56-57
(1993). See also, TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 98 ("Among the factors that may have
been responsible [for Hofstede's finding] are the British influence, affluence, the
open frontier, and social and geographic mobility. Most of the immigrants must have
been more individualistic than their ingroups, since moving requires breaking with
the traditional behaviors.").
89. "Freedom is perhaps the most resonant, deeply held American value."
BELLAH ET AL., supra note 62, at 23.
90. Id. at 32-33 (arguing that Franklin represented the quintessential utilitarian
individualist).
91. Id. at 146-47 (labeling Lincoln as the typical American individualist).
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nations that did not pay monthly grants to families with children to
help defray the costs of child rearing. 9' Since then, the situation has
not improved. Today, despite having a GDP per capita among the
highest in the world, the United States still leads major industrialized
nations in the proportion of children living in poverty (20.5%). 9' At
the same time, the United States boasts extremely low taxes
compared to what one finds in major European democracies, and the
highest imbalance in CEO-to-worker pay ratios in the world." Such
inequities are tolerable in our society because of the individualistic
undercurrents that tell us that individual effort and initiative
determine outcomes and, therefore, each person gets what he
deserves. Finally, our liberal political tradition and the embodiment
of negative liberties rather than positive liberties in our Constitution
demonstrate the intensity of our individualism. Many European
nations, also predominantly individualist, include positive guarantees
in their constitutions. The fact that the U.S. Constitution guarantees
only negative rights (with the possible exception of the criminally
accused's right to counsel and the right to trial by jury) demonstrates
the comparative strength of individualism in America.
C. The Individualist Undercurrents of Adversarial Legalism
As previously stated, the crux of Kagan's adversarial legalism is
(1) our adversary system for solving legal disputes, and (2) the extent
to and purposes for which that system is used. Both of the elements
can be explored in more detail when viewed through the I/C lens.
1. The Adversary System
Despite the fact that America is alone in the world in employing
a hyper-adversarial system to resolve disputes,9" the uniqueness of the
92. ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, NOT FOR THE POOR ALONE:
EUROPEAN SOCIAL SERVICES 153 (1975).
93. SYLVIA ANN HEWLETIT & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PARENTS 47
(1998).
94. GANNON, supra note 60, at 350. In 1996, the CEO/average worker pay ratio
stood at 209:1. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 93, at 62. Since then, it has more than
doubled, to 411:1 in 2001, after spiking to 531:1 in 2000. Facts and Figures, Part 2:
Income Patterns, 2.3-CEO Pay as a Multiple of Average Worker Pay, 1960-99, at
<www.inequality.org/facts3fr.html> (visited Nov. 13, 2003) (identifying Business
Week as its source). Such imbalances are unheard of among other developed nations.
95. The British system has also been labeled adversarial. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 21 (1996). Even so,
the British system is not as intensely adversarial as the American system by any
[Vol. 27:319
Legalistic Individualism: An Alternative Analysis
adversary system is seldom discussed in American law schools. 96
Instead, it is taken as a given.97 In the United States, choosing a
system for resolving disputes that reflects intensely individualistic
values and assumptions seems natural. To many, it is so natural that
they forget that there is, in fact, a choice involved.
The adversary system consists of four elements: party control and
presentation (what Kagan calls "litigant activism"); a neutral decision
making tribunal; zealous advocacy; and a formalized system of rules
and procedures.9 Working together, these four features ensure that
disputes are resolved not only in a way that appears fair to outsiders,
but also justly and accurately.' The story goes something like this:
because only he who is personally invested in a particular dispute will
have the incentive to proffer the best arguments on his behalf, the
litigants themselves must be responsible for gathering all available
means. See generally Dennis Turner & Solomon Fulero, Can Civility Return to the
Courtroom? Will American Jurors Like It?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 169 (1997)
(reporting results of a research survey in which subjects found the British mock trial
to be more civil than the American mock trial). Further, recent changes to British
procedure have made British procedure even less adversarial by vesting more
authority in the judge. Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and
Comparative Procedure (Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 39, at n. 108, 2002), at <http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=306759>
(visited Nov. 13, 2003). But see William T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary System"?,
100 W. VA. L. REV. 847 (1998) (arguing that the line between "adversarial" and non
adversarial systems is not clear and thus it is difficult to tell whether other nations'
systems are, in fact, adversarial).
96. University of Colorado Law Professor William Pizzi relates:
[Wihen some respected judge or trial attorney gives a lecture at my law
school and announces with fervor that "ours is an adversary system,"
confident that he or she has expressed some obvious and basic truth about
our American legal system, I nod in agreement like the rest of the audience.
But deep down I do not understand the distinction being drawn and what is
supposed to separate the American trial system, and presumably the English
system, from other western trial systems.
Pizzi, supra note 95, at 847. See also MARIA WYANT Cuzzo, HABERMAS'
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION THEORY AND THE ADVERSARIAL ASSUMPTION OF THE
CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM 14 (1995) (arguing that current legal scholarship pays
insufficient attention to the adversary system); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and
the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301 (1989) ("The hallmark of
American adjudication is the adversary system. The virtues of the adversary system
are so deeply engrained in the American legal psyche that most lawyers do not
question it.").
97. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713,713 (1983).
98. See, e.g., FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR
TRIAL REFORM 13-16 (1996).
99. Landsman, supra note 97, at 714.
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evidence and formulating arguments therefrom.'" The judge (and
other agents of government) stay out of the process of investigation
and argument formulation. Zealous advocacy flows directly from
litigant activism-at least when the litigant himself is putting the case
together.
To correct the potential dilution of this incentive caused by the
use of lawyers (rather than the litigants themselves) to do much of
this work, a system of formalized ethical rules (including the
requirement of zealous advocacy)' is in place to ensure that the
lawyer zealously pursues the interests of her client. And to prevent
any potential overreach on behalf of the zealous advocate, other
ethical, procedural and evidentiary rules keep the game fair." When
it is time for trial, two advocates square off before a neutral fact-
finder (usually a jury) and a neutral legal decision maker (always a
judge). From this clash of interests and arguments before a neutral
umpire, truth emerges, and justice is done."
Each of the tenets, and the way they function in harmony with
one another, reflects an individualist worldview. First of all, in an
adversarial trial the system's focus is on the individual litigants and
their pursuit of their interests, rather than society's pursuit of justice.
The individual disputants themselves-not a government entity-
decide when to pursue their interests via a court battle. Thus, the
adversary system allows individuals to determine when social
resources (the courts) are needed to resolve their disputes. This
100. Id. at 715; Sward, supra note 96, at 310. In addition to this incentive-based
benefit, party control also enables participants to view the process as more fair. See
Oscar G. Chase, Legal Process and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INTL'L & COMP.
L. 1, 21 (1997) (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 208 (1988)).
101. Perhaps the most classic statement of the role of zealous advocacy dates back
to Queen Caroline of England's trial for adultery in 1821. Her lawyer, Lord
Brougham, stated:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go
on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve
his country in confusion.
David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (D. Luban, ed. 1984) at 83, 86.
102. Landsman, supra note 97, at 716-17.
103. Id. at 714.
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elevation of individual interests over those of society is perfectly
congruent with the individualist ethos-indeed, it is the essence of the
individualist ethos." Were the trial a matter of society's quest for
justice, the lawyer's primary duty would run to society, rather than to
her client's interests. Further, the high value that individualists place
on rationality leads them to speak the language of incentives. In this
way, the "who else would care enough to do it well?" rationale for
litigant activism reflects these underlying individualist values.' 5
Perhaps the most obvious instantiation of individualistic thought
in the adversary system is the minimization of the state's role.
Adversary theory's requirement of decision-maker neutrality requires
the judge to take a back seat to the advocates during the trial. The
judge in an adversary proceeding does not play an active role in
questioning witnesses or in pointing out the importance of exhibits.
Those functions are left to the lawyers. In practice, most American
trial judges take this requirement a step further. Rather than strive
merely to remain neutral, they act passively by refusing to take action
even at times when judicial action would correct asymmetries that
detract from the trial process' neutrality.'°6 Evidence of this passivity
can be seen in the infrequency with which federal judges exercise
their power to appoint neutral experts under Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence,1" or their power to call and interrogate witnesses
under Rule 614 of the Rules of Evidence." The jury is another
institution designed to minimize the state's role in the proceedings, by
104. TRIANDIS, supra note 64, at 72.
105. It is interesting to note the parallel between the rationale for litigant activism
and one of the primary arguments for private ownership of industries-the notion
that assets are taken care of only when someone has a vested interest in (i.e., "owns")
them.
106. Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer
Representation, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 696 (1997). Passivity can prevent judges
from obtaining knowledge about a case necessary to render a fair decision. One New
York State Supreme Court judge relates, "The American judge ... is fearful of
intervening, often uninformed of the details of the case, and unable to comment on
the evidence. His [interventions] will be scrutinized by appellate courts." JUDGE
HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29 (1996).
Rothwax continues, "Although a judge is committed to the search for the truth, he is
also required by the rules of the game to sit helplessly by while professionals are
engaged in a clearly deliberate and entirely proper effort to frustrate the search." Id.
at 135
107. See Oscar G. Chase, Culture and Disputing, 7 TUL. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 81,
88-89 (1999).
108. John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 992 (1990).
2004]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
removing from the judge the job of fact-finding."° In sum, the
minimization of the state's role reflects the individualist's hostility
toward, and suspicion of, government power.
The influence of individualism is reflected in the system's
underlying assumptions as well as its observable attributes. The
adversary system's foundational assumption of rationality reflects an
individualistic worldview. This assumption is necessary if one is to
believe that the adversary system will yield optimal results. The
lynchpin of the adversary ideal is the notion that when diametrically
opposed arguments are aired before a neutral decisionmaker, the
better argument will win, and therefore the "right" side will be
victorious. However, this idea will not hold when the decisionmaker
is not rational. If the decisionmaker is not rational, there is little
sense in holding a trial-the decisionmaker might as well determine
guilt or innocence based on the defendant's hair color or the design of
the prosecutor's tie. In other words, absent a high degree of
decisionmaker rationality, a trial by jury is about as sensible as a trial
by ordeal. Either way, random chance will determine the outcome.
Rationality's 'central place in the logic of the adversary system
demonstrates the intense presence of individualistic thought.
Another underlying individualistic assumption of adversary
theory is that of (roughly) equal power among the disputants.
Adversary theory holds that the party on whose side the facts and the
law fall will emerge from trial victorious-not that the party with the
better lawyer, or the party who can better withstand endless
procedural delays will win. In order for practice to follow theory, the
two disputants must have roughly equal power to hire and
compensate investigators, experts and attorneys. This tendency to
assume away the realities of power relationships is common in
individualistic systems because the intense focus on negative liberties
crowds out a robust conception of positive ones."'
The underlying explanation for why the system works also
reflects an individualistic worldview. The notion that socially optimal
results emerge from the clash of competing interests is common
among individualists, and is reflected in American capitalist
109. See Landsman, supra note 97, at 723-24.
110. Undergraduate economics textbooks are perhaps the greatest example of this
habit of glossing over the issue of power. As they tell the story of competition, they
assume that the buyers and sellers come to the market with no ability to influence
price. Lacking this ability, these fictitious buyers and sellers are all on equal footing
with one another. See, e.g., BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY (1994).
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economics,"' as well as in the "winner take all" system of elections in
the United States. This pattern reflects an assumption firmly
implanted in the individualist paradigm-that when individuals
pursue their own interests, they end up better off than when they
engage in cooperative behavior.112
2. The Use of Disputes to Formulate Policy
Applying the individualist analysis to the practice of using
disputes as vehicles for policy formulation reveals that many of the
same reasons for the selection of the adversary system favor the use
of disputes to resolve policy. Just as the adversary system removes
power from the political branches (especially the executive branch),
so too does formulating policy through the courts. Such a mode of
policy formulation removes the possibility that overzealous
bureaucrats will implement policies based on their own whims.
Instead, a policy must withstand the process of adversarial litigation
before it will receive the stamp of approval from a (theoretically)
non-partisan judge. Further, the incentives that the adversary system
incorporates to ensure that the best arguments win will also work to
ensure that the best policies are enacted. Because only interested
parties can bring lawsuits, the story goes, we can be certain that the
arguments proffered in court will be the best available for each
substantive policy goal. Airing these arguments in a courtroom
setting will guarantee that the best policy, not the one most beneficial
to politicians, bureaucrats or their cronies will be implemented. In
these ways, using the courts to implement policy fits just as well into
the individualist narrative as does employing the adversary system to
resolve disputes.
III. Merits of a Cultural Explanation
Thus far, it has been suggested that Adversarial Legalism could
use a different discourse to explain the same phenomenon. While this
may or may not interest the reader, it begs an important question-
"So what?" In this section, I seek to explain why it matters that
Kagan's work could be recast in the language of I/C. More
specifically, I argue that the individualist explanation of adversarial
111. See HUNT, supra note 82, at 38-40.
112. Sward, supra note 96, at 313 (stating that the adversary system "is highly
individualistic.... It seeks a solution by enabling the litigants to seek their own self-
interest without regard for others; indeed, it expects them to argue selfishly.").
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legalism plugs some holes left by Kagan's analysis, enables us to
better recognize the shortcomings of adversarial legalism and serves
as a useful aid in forecasting and strategizing reform.
A. Filling Gaps in Kagan's Analysis
Frequently, Kagan's analysis of adversarial legalism and its roots
leads to further questions: Of course our government is structured to
fragment power... but why? Why was the United States already
leading the "adversarial arms race" in 1960, before the escalation of
adversarial legalism? Why are Americans so neurotically suspicious
of centralized authority? Why has the United States chosen a scheme
for resolving disputes so radically different from even those nations
that have similar cultural, religious and philosophical traditions?
Why is it that administrative and bureaucratic tribunals in the United
States (e.g., workers' compensation boards and the NLRB) so often
take on the adversarial characteristics of the court proceedings they
replaced? The individualist analysis provides a more complete
answer to these questions.
As previously stated, individualism is not new to this country. It
has been a part of the American experience since the colonial days.
Indeed, strong expressions of individualism can be found in the words
of many of our Framers. For example, in support of the proposed
National Bank in 1790, Alexander Hamilton stated, "To attach full
confidence to an institution of this nature, it appears to be an
essential ingredient in its structure, that it shall be under a private, not
a public direction-under the guidance of individual interest, not of
public policy.""3  Historians such as Gordon Wood"4 and Ralph
Gabriel"5 have recognized and explicated the connections between
the Founders' individualistic liberalism and the shape of our
government.
Understanding this tradition of individualism also helps to
explain why the United States has chosen such a different path than
those nations that parallel us culturally. Western European and
Canadian systems are certainly individualistic, yet their individualism
113. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106
(13th ed. 1997) (emphasis added).
114. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1992).
115. See LAWRENCE MITCHELL, STACKED DECK: A STORY OF SELFISHNESS IN
AMERICA 12 (1998) (citing Ralph Gabriel).
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lacks the tenacity of ours. Our nation was born out of a dispute with
a more powerful ruling nation, and our experience with England's
powerful government led our Founders to construct a government in
which the state's power would be severely limited. This early distrust
of power has remained a vital element of the American spirit
throughout the centuries, and this tradition explains why adversarial
legalism is much more deeply entrenched here than it is in culturally
similar nations.
Our longstanding individualism also explains why the adversary
system was in place in the United States for over 150 years prior to
the adversarial explosion that Kagan traces to the 1960s." 6 Further,
the association between individualism, competition and argument
illustrates why allegedly non-adversarial fora, such as a workers'
compensation appeals board, have a tendency to turn adversarial in
the United States. Because it answers these "further questions," the
individualist explanation of adversarial legalism is more complete
than Kagan's analysis.
B. Recognition of Adversarial Legalism's Shortcomings
Kagan's critique of adversarial legalism can be summed up very
quickly-adversarial legalism is inefficient and often unfair. But to
understand where and why adversarial legalism is inefficient or
unfair, it is useful to get closer to the heart of the problem. The
individualist explanation of adversarial legalism pushes us closer.
The individualist explanation of adversarial legalism lets us see
more clearly the underlying logic and assumptions of adversarial
legalism. Employing the language of individualism, we can better see
how adversarial legalism is supposed to work and upon which
assumptions this explanation relies. In this sense, the individualist
language is a useful tool for beginning an evaluation of our dispute
resolution system. By shedding light on the underlying assumptions,
the individualist analysis permits us to better question the validity of
these assumptions. To the extent that these assumptions are
inaccurate, we can see that the system is flawed and in need of
reform.
For example, although the United States relies heavily on the
market to allocate and distribute resources, it does not rely on the
116. See Landsman, supra note 97, at 713 (dating the adversary system back to the
time of the American Revolution).
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market exclusively. Instead, reforms have been instituted to correct
for "market failures"-instances in which one of the underlying
assumptions of the market system is violated. One of the key
assumptions of the market system is the assumption of perfectly
rational buyers and sellers. According to this assumption, caveat
emptor is the proper rule, as perfectly rational consumers will enter
into a transaction only after they have done the necessary homework
to determine that the product they are about to receive will do all that
it promises. However, anyone who has ever spent time with other
people should find it easy to recognize that human beings are seldom
perfectly rational. Thus, consumer protection laws have been
implemented to prevent crafty sellers from taking advantage of
consumers' irrationality. The need for such reforms becomes clear
only once we are able to see the system's underlying assumptions, and
thereby understand what exactly went wrong.
A parallel analysis can be applied to the adversary system. One
of the individualistic assumptions of adversary theory discussed above
was the assumption of equal power." 7 Certainly, this assumption is
frequently met-disputes between divorcing husbands and wives or
between giant corporations are likely to take place on a roughly level
playing field. However, the assumption is also frequently violated.
Disputes between workers or consumers and giant corporations
generally feature massive power asymmetries that permit the
corporations to hire teams of attorneys to drag the case on or to
squash the smaller party's case via elaborate procedural maneuvering.
In situations like these, it is difficult to tell whether the winner won
because it had the better argument or the better personnel. Just as
the market fails when sellers possess favorable information
asymmetries, so does the adversary system fail when power
asymmetries exist. Thus, the strict application of the adversarial
process can lead to results irreconcilable with adversary theory.
When this occurs, reforms that aim at the violated assumption are
necessary.
In sum, the individualist explanation helps us to better
understand the roots of adversarial legalism's shortcomings, which
will thereby enable us to generate reform proposals that aim with
pinpoint accuracy at the problem's heart. Or, to use a medical
analogy, by using an individualist explanation of adversarial legalism,
we will be better able to cure the disease, rather than merely treat the
117. See infra, pt. II.C.1.
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symptoms.
C. Forecasting and Strategizing Reform
Not only does the individualist analysis of adversarial legalism
permit us to generate better proposals for reform of our legal system,
it also enables us to predict the likelihood that these changes will
succeed and to develop better strategies for their implementation.
Proposals for adversary system reform have bounced around
legal academia for decades. One of the most prominent is John
Langbein's The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,"8 in which
Langbein argued that the United States should adopt the Federal
Republic of Germany's method of disputation in court. According to
Langbein, "by assigning judges rather than lawyers to investigate the
facts, the Germans avoid the most troublesome aspects of our
practice."' 19 Langbein concluded that adoption of German procedure
would dramatically cut litigation costs'20 and prevent partisan lawyers
from intentionally or unintentionally clouding the veracity of witness
testimony. 21
Langbein's proposal elicited a substantial number of responses.122
Many questioned the advertised benefits of German procedure;
others debated the prospects for adoption in the United States.
Among the latter were articles by John C. Reitz123 and Oscar Chase.124
Rietz argued that differences between German and American legal
cultures would render such changes difficult to implement without
uprooting other aspects of our system.2 Alternatively, Chase focused
on the national cultures of Germany and the United States. Chase
noted that Langbein had forgotten to account for this variable, and
argued that regardless of how well the German system of civil
procedure worked in Germany, it probably would not work here.
118. Langbein, supra note 20.
119. Id. at 824.
120. Id. at 845.
121. Id. at 833-35.
122. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A
Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw.
U.L. REV. 705 (1988); Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?: A
Comment on the Comparison of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 587
(1988); Chase, supra note 100; Reitz, supra note 108.
123. Reitz, supra note 108.
124. Chase, supra note 100.
125. Reitz, supra note 108, at 988.
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German and American national and legal cultures are just too
different, largely due to the greater intensity of individualism in the
United States. As Chase pointed out, "[l]ocal forms of disputing...
are both an expression of a culture's values and a mechanism for
maintaining those values., 126  The individualist American culture
leads the United States to choose dispute resolution methods that are
more consistent with individualism and to distrust those that place
greater power in the hands of the state. '27 Chase's primary point was
that such considerations must be taken into account before
attempting to borrow another nation's institutions or procedures.
Chase's observation is prescient. Further, it indicates an
important way in which an individualist analysis of adversarial
legalism may inform our assessments of the likelihood of change. Just
as the cultural mismatch between Germany and the United States will
likely stand in the way of Langbein's proposed reforms, the intensity
of individualism in American culture similarly indicates that
proposals to dampen the individualistic flavor of our method of
dispute resolution will face major obstacles.
Along similar lines, analyzing adversarial legalism in individualist
terms permits us to pitch proposals for reform in ways that maximize
chances of success. If proposals for reform of the adversary system or
the extent to which it is used are to be taken seriously, they must be
skillfully placed within the individualistic rhetoric spoken by
Americans. As Lawrence Mitchell put it, "the values of individualism
and autonomy are so deeply ingrained in American society that any
attempt to destroy those values will not be taken seriously by policy
makers." '128 In other words, if proposals for adversary reform are to
be granted serious consideration, they must either be incremental
changes, consistent with the values of individualism or autonomy, or
they must be "sneak attacks" that disguise the extent to which they
affront these values.
Using the language of individualism brings into the foreground
the fact that we are dealing with an individualist culture and thus aids
us in phrasing proposed reforms in a way that is palatable for
individualists. For example, emphasizing the needs of the collective is
not an effective strategy to convince an individualist. Instead, it is
necessary to emphasize individualist values such as rationality,
126. Chase, supra note 100, at 9.
127. Id. at 1.
128. MITCHELL, supra note 115, at 93.
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autonomy, independence and competition or to emphasize the extent
to which reality deviates from the individualist story. Only when
proposals for reform are cast in terms of these values will they
overcome the cultural obstacles to change.
In this sense, evaluating Adversarial Legalism through the prism
of individualism demonstrates some serious problems with Kagan's
reform proposals. Although Kagan states that his proposals should
not be read as a laundry list of "what to do to tame adversarial
legalism," many of the proposals are still too anti-individualistic to be
taken at all seriously in the United States. For example, Kagan
proposes greater regulation as a way to decrease the amount of civil
litigation in the United States.129 While this approach has helped to
keep litigation rates in Continental Europe down, it is unlikely to
work here. Because our culture has bought so deeply into the
individualist story, tampering with the results of market processes is
the exception, not the rule. Americans cheer the recent wave of
deregulation and advocate more of the same. This demonstrates that
calls for "greater regulation" are unlikely to draw serious
consideration. The same goes for Kagan's call for more active
questioning from the bench in criminal trials. 3° In a society so eager
to "get government off people's backs," is it at all likely that we
would adopt reforms of our criminal procedure that would provide an
agent of the state with a more active role? I highly doubt it.
That said, applying the individualist analysis exposes some areas
in which hope for reform is justified. For instance, revamping the
current system of dueling litigant-paid experts to make greater use of
court-appointed experts is a fairly dramatic reform, yet it is one that
can be cast in rhetoric palatable (if not appealing) to an American
audience. In one sense, such a reform could be seen as state
encroachment-just another instance of the government sticking its
nose where it does not belong. However, neutral experts also serve
several highly individualistic goals.
As mentioned previously, to the extent that the assumption of
roughly equal power does not hold, the adversary system fails.
Rather than healthy competition producing the results of the trial,
other, less-legitimate factors may determine the outcome. Thus, by
analyzing the adversary system through the lens of individualism, we
can see the exact point of departure of reality from theory. That
129. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 235-36.
130. Id. at 234.
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disparity, then, can be emphasized in a reform campaign. The way to
sell a reform, such as greater use of neutral experts, is to emphasize
that in a system where "hired guns" are paraded into court, wealth
rather than merit can often dictate legal outcomes. Competition in
such cases is a sham, and to restore this exalted value to its rightful
place in an individualistic society, a reform (though somewhat anti-
individualistic on its face) is necessary. Only then can the
individualistic system deliver the results that it promises. The point is
that recognizing that reforms are being pitched to an individualistic
audience enables those who advocate them to mask the extent to
which the reforms run counter to the individualist ethos by
emphasizing that they are necessary for the individualist story to
function as it is supposed to.
Even arguments for more expansive bureaucracies can be
couched in individualist language. For the adversary system to
produce justice, individuals must have access to the courts. However,
in many instances, this assumption is not met. Many disputes are over
such small sums that it is not practical to litigate them. If a case is
"worth" only a couple thousand dollars, it is not likely to attract many
lawyers to take the case on a contingency fee basis. Paying a lawyer
by the hour is generally not an option because the lawyer's fees would
eat up the potential award before the case was anywhere near ready
for trial. Yet, even cases of this small magnitude (in lawyer terms)
can have far-reaching effects on the lives of low- to middle-income
families. In many of these cases, justice cannot be done because the
cases are structurally blocked from court. Thus, the adversary system
fails to live up to its promise of providing justice to those who are in
the right.
One strategy to remedy this adversary failure caused by lack of
access to justice is to create agencies similar to the Japanese Traffic
Accident Dispute Resolution Centers. Again, a reform that involves
the creation of a non-court governmental body to resolve disputes is
immediately suspect because it is anti-individualistic on its face.
However, the merits of this reform can also be colored to fit within
the individualist palette. Emphasizing that the agencies will provide
individuals with access to justice that they previously lacked will likely
resonate well with an individualistic audience because of the
individualist emphasis on rights and their effective enforcement.
Further, it could be emphasized that such a reform would further the
value of independence by making citizens less dependent on lawyers,
and better able to represent their own interests, rather than relying on
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an intermediary from an often-distrusted profession.
My point here is not that Kagan's ideas for reform are
substantively bad; I am prone to support many of them. However, I
think Kagan's failure to analyze American culture in greater depth
has prevented him from envisioning more creative ways to tame
adversarial legalism, ones that can be packaged to fit within the
individualist rhetoric acceptable to American culture. This failure is
akin to a standup comedian's failure to learn about his audience
before performing, and it saps the book of much of its potential for
spurring reforms to America's adversarial legalism.
Conclusion
In sum, Kagan's Adversarial Legalism is an important book not
only for reformers and legal policy wonks, but also for legal scholars
and practicing lawyers as well. Besides being well-researched and
well-written, Adversarial Legalism touches on issues that should be at
the forefront of each practicing lawyer's thought. What limits should
I place on the zeal of my advocacy? What duties do I, as a lawyer,
owe to society, above and beyond those owed to my client? Is there a
better way to resolve a given dispute than to bicker with all my
might?
Importantly, Adversarial Legalism reminds lawyers in the
American monolith that other societies have created different
systems for resolving disputes, even after they were able to observe
how the American adversary system operates. The book
demonstrates that our methods of resolving disputes did not descend
from the heavens, but rather reflect a series of choices made years
ago. And to the extent that those methods no longer serve us well,
we should be able to make different choices today. These lessons
should remain fresh in each of our minds. Nevertheless, I think that
Kagan's analysis of how adversarial legalism developed glosses over
some overriding cultural issues. The consequence of this oversight is
that Kagan underestimates the difficulty of making different choices
and fails to appreciate how such reforms must be pitched in America.
I should make clear that I do not think that Kagan's causal
explanation of the recent surge in adversarial legalism is wrong. In
fact I think Kagan's analysis is correct, but incomplete. The
individualist explanation of adversarial legalism and its sources
provides a more complete analysis of the problem and thereby
provides better avenues for reform.
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